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New parties in the Polish party system 2011–2018: The Palikot Movement, Kukiz’15 and the Modern Party of Ryszard Petru as genuinely new parties? The Polish party system has experienced several major changes since 1989. The last important change occurred in 2001, when two new parties were formed – the Law and Justice and the Civic Platform – which have since dominated the party competition in Poland and have been accused of almost completely blocking the system. However, since 2011, several new parties have emerged, claiming to represent a new quality in Polish politics. The subject of the analysis includes all those parties that entered the Polish parliament for the first time after the 2011 (the Palikot Movement) and 2015 elections (Kukiz’15, the Modern Party of Ryszard Petru). In order to assess their degree of novelty, the interval index of party congruence/novelty as proposed by Sikk and Köker is used. The parties chosen are analyzed in terms of their organization, leadership and candidate selection. Comparing these parties, we show the highest level of novelty in the case of the Modern Party, followed by Kukiz’15, with the Palikot Movement at the end. The other important conclusion concerns the phenomenon of bipolarity in Polish politics, which is related to the long-lasting rivalry between the Law and Justice and the Civic Platform parties, which prevents new parties from gaining political relevance. The emergence of three parties able to gain parliamentary seats shows that this bipolarity is not as ‘rigid’ as it may be perceived, hence new entrants into Polish politics are still possible.

Keywords: Poland, party system, new parties, The Palikot Movement, Kukiz’15, Modern Party of Ryszard Petru


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1. Introduction

Since in Western and Central-Eastern Europe mainstream parties have lost their ability to capture as many votes as earlier, new parties have found their way into party systems at both the electoral and parliamentary levels. In the context of Central and East European party politics is even referred to as the ‘hurricane season’, characterized by three dynamics: losses by established parties, rapid gains by newcomers and equally rapid newcomer losses to even newer parties (Haughton and Deegan-Krause 2015). However, not all parties that enter parliament for the first time are completely new. Whereas some are created from scratch, other have certain links with organized groups and should be considered as rooted newcomers. The origin of new parties is crucial since it can influence their electoral gains at the follow-up election. For example, entrepreneurial parties – created by and around a leader without any external support (Krouwel 2006; Hloušek and Kopeček 2017) – are perceived as less likely to perform well in any subsequent election following their electoral breakthrough than is the case for rooted formations. This is because entrepreneurs have not yet formed a structure and therefore are less able to recruit members and candidates that are loyal and capable, while rooted newcomers can rely on their ties to organized groups serving as a recruitment pool (Bolleyer and Bytzek 2016). The same is true with new parties that have emerged as a result of a split or the merger of earlier existing formations; as they could in a sense inherit structure, members, candidates and other resources. However, there is doubt as to whether these parties are still new or to the extent that they are new. Hence, it is essential to answer the question: what does mean that a party is new or how can one distinguish a new party from an old one? Even if the question seems to be simple, in fact it is not.

The explanation is that parties can be new in different ways (Beyens et al. 2017) and it is not only about party splits, mergers or name changes, but also about parties taking part in elections for the first time (if they have existed earlier as organizations) (Bolleyer 2013) or parties competing on new issues (Lucardi 2000). There is a growing literature on how to define a new party. Robert Harmel and John D. Robertson in their research on reasons for new parties emergence and electoral success consider as new parties both genuinely new formations, but also these resulting from splits, mergers and reorganizations (Harmel 1985; Harmel and Robertson 1985). Other researchers narrow the definition of new parties to the completely new and only to those mergers or splits that have adopted new names, ones different from the names of their predecessors (Birch 2013) or in the case of a split even tend to consider the largest party as a successor and only the others (the smaller factions) as new (Bolleyer 2013; Mainwaring et al. 2016). There are also definitions that consider parties as new merely when they do not derive from the structure of existing parties, something that excludes mergers and
splits (Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2015). The definition of Allan Sikk is even narrower, he excluded not only all parties resulting from splits and mergers, but also those in which there is continuity in terms of political leadership and personnel (2005). In turn, Simon Hug (2001) and Margit Tavits (2006) have drawn attention to other factors. According to them, a new party is an organization that for the first time appoints candidates at the general election to the parliament. Shlomit Barnea and Gideon Rahat define a new party as “a party that has a new label and that no more than half of its top candidates (...) originate from a single former party” (Barnea and Rahat 2010: 311).

The common feature of the above mentioned definitions is that they all regard ‘newness’ as a dichotomous variable. According to them, a party can be qualified as new or old. However, there are a lot of parties that are partly new or new simply to some extent. Hence, there are some other, more sophisticated concepts, in which newness is treated as a non-dichotomous variable (Barnea and Rahat 2010; Litton 2015; Sikk and Köker 2017). For example, Shlomit Barnea and Gideon Rahat use in their research the idea of ‘three faces’ of political party: party-in-the-electorate, party-as-organization, party-in-government distinguished by Valdimer O. Key Jr. (1964) in order to measure the level of ‘newness’ in each of them (Barnea and Rahat 2010). The unquestionable advantage of the concept is that ‘newness’ is researched in a few areas, however, in each of them it is still treated as a dichotomous variable, hence we can answer the question as to in which areas a party is new, but not to what extent. In turn Allan Sikk and Philipp Köker’s idea of an interval scale of party congruence versus novelty enables the measurement of the level of party ‘newness’ in each of areas distinguished by them: organization, leadership, candidate selection (Sikk and Köker 2017), hence this will be used as the basic framework in the present article.

The subject of the analysis will be all parties that for the first time entered the Polish parliament following the 2011 and 2015 elections. In 2011 this was the Palikot Movement (Ruch Palikota, RP) and in 2015 two formations: the Association for a New Constitution Kukiz’15 (Stowarzyszeniarnarzecz Nowej Konstytucji Kukiz’15, Kukiz’15), and the Modern Party of Ryszard Petru (Nowoczesna Ryszarda Petru, N). It must be admitted that Kukiz’15 is a kind of ‘non-partisan party’ as it is not formally registered as a political party and claims that it is not a party. However, we have decided to include it in our research, considering it as a political party, using the Giovanni Sartori’s minimal definition of party: “A party is any political group that presents [itself] at elections, and is capable of placing through elections, candidates for public office” (Sartori 2005: 57).

The aim of the analysis is to answer the questions as to whether the discussed formations at the moment of entering parliament were really new and what the level of their ‘newness’ was. The problem is crucial as it is often claimed that even if parties are new, people in these parties are still the same or that we are dealing with an old wine (candidates) in new bottles (parties) (Barnea and Rahat 2010: 311; Kasprowicz and Zweiffel 2014), hence not all parties that we at first glance consider to be new are really
completely new. The article is divided into three parts. In the first one the analytical framework elaborated by Sikk and Köker (2017) is presented in detail as it is further necessary as a point of departure to discuss new parties in Poland. In the second part the Polish party system since the turn of the century is briefly outlined in order to show the place which new parties have taken within it. The third part is entirely devoted to the detailed analysis of the parties that entered the Polish parliament for the first time following the 2011 and 2015 elections. Sikk and Köker’s dimensions of party novelty and their operationalization are employed to assess the level of newness of the analyzed formations. During our analysis we used a variety of methods and datasets, including content analysis and desk research. The conclusions summarize the findings of the multidimensional research based on party documents, especially party statutes; national elections studies as well as biographies and studies devoted to Polish political parties.

2. Analytical framework of Sikk and Köker

Using the framework for analysis of party ‘newness’ as elaborated by Sikk and Köker, it is worth mentioning that they based their index of political party’s congruence/novelty on merely three dimensions: (1) organization, including the party name; (2) leader; and (3) candidates. These researchers are fully aware that party change is not limited to these aspects, but may include also party programs, something that is visible in the concept of Barnea and Rahat. However, they decided to ignore this dimension claiming that programmatic changes are more difficult to measure and that party competition is not always programmatic, especially in Central and Eastern Europe (Sikk and Köker 2017: 2). The other aspect which was omitted in their concept is the electoral base of a new party and the overlap this has with the base of the previously existing party or parties.

Even if the mentioned omissions are crucial and worth completing in the future development of the index, the tool created by Sikk and Köker is very useful as it enables one to assess and compare the novelty/congruence of the analyzed parties in a very simple qualitative way. ‘Congruence’ refers to the level of similarity between a pair of formations in a consecutive election. In turn ‘novelty’ refers to the degree of ‘newness’ of a formation when compared to a predecessor or all previous formations combined. The biggest advantage of the Sikk and Köker concept is that they propose an interval scale of party novelty. They do not limit themselves to formulate merely the dimensions (criteria) of congruence/novelty, but also operationalize them. The proposed index ranges from ‘zero’ which means perfect novelty to ‘one’ that is perfect congruence; this index is used in all three dimensions. The operationalization is presented in Tables 1–3.
In the first table there is the operationalization of organizational structure. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that the authors of the index decided to include here the party name as well. When a formation retains the same structure and name, it is recognized as the full continuation of the existing party; the congruence reaches its maximum value, which in the scale used is 'one.' In turn, when a party has a completely new structure and name, the congruence reaches its minimum value, which is 'zero,' and this means that the party is completely new. However, between these extremes there are three intermediary stages that allow one to assess whether a formation is more or less new as far as its name and structures are concerned (see Table 1).

**Table 1.** Operationalization of organizational structure and party name (dimension 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>a genuinely old formation must retain both organizational structure and name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>a formation with minor change to its name, organizational structure or both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>a formation with more substantial change to its name, organizational structure or both (e.g., a merger of two similarly sized formations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>a formation that uses an old name despite being organizationally highly novel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>a genuinely new formation must have no identifiable precursors in terms of both organizational structure and name</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed by the authors on the basis of Sikk and Köker (2017: 3).

In the second table we have placed the operationalization of the party leader dimension. When there is no party leader change, the index takes rank ‘one’ that means perfect congruence; while when a new leader is outside of politics and has no previous experiences in this matter the index describes the case as ‘zero,’ that is a complete lack of congruence, hence perfect novelty. Between these boundary cases there are three ranks that allow one to evaluate a new leader’s activity in earlier existing party and his political involvements (see Table 2).

**Table 2.** Operationalization of party leader change (dimension 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>no leadership change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>a new leader has previously been near the party leadership, leading a faction or holding a top political office for the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>a new leader has held a political office as an independent or a medium-ranking office in the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>a new leader has held a low profile in the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>a new leader has no previous political experiences</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Developed by the authors on the basis of Sikk and Köker (2017: 3).

In the third table there is the operationalization of party candidates’ selection. Nonetheless this operationalization differs from the previous ones. Whereas in the first
two Sikk and Köker use a five-level-scale, here they point out only the boundary cases –
when all the candidates of a party took part in the previous election as candidates of the
same party (rank ‘one’) and when none of the candidates contested the previous election
with the same formation (rank ‘zero’). Between these borders the congruence depends
on the share of candidates who previously ran on the list of the earlier existing party or
parties. However, it is essential to mention that whereas in earlier studies researchers
tended to compare the whole lists of candidates, Sikk and Köker claim that there is a
high level of turnover among candidates with no electoral prospects and a noticeably
higher stability among highly ranking candidates, hence it is reasonable to focus on the
‘top’ of the candidates lists because mainly it is here that we can find a substantive
degree of continuity. These scholars propose analyzing the top 25% of candidates
relative to size of the assembly or district magnitude and compare them with all the
candidates from the previous election\textsuperscript{2}. When there is a lack of data concerning
candidates, it is possible to consider the parliamentary representatives instead.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\hline
1 & all candidates of a formation contested the previous elections with the same formation \\
1 > x < 0 & the share of candidates who contested the previous election with the same formation \\
0 & none of the candidates contested the previous elections with the same formation \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Operationalization of party candidates’ selection (dimension 3)}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{2} Source: Developed by the authors on the basis of Sikk and Köker (2017: 3).

3. Polish party system since the turn of the century

In a brief outline of the development of the Polish party system since its inception in the
early 1990s, Radosław Markowski characterized it as unstable, with particularly low
electoral turnout, high voter volatility and equally high fluidity concerning political
parties (Markowski 2006: 816). However, the same author points out, that at the turn of
the century the Polish party system experienced major realignment and began to show
some traces of stabilization (Markowski 2008: 1058). Shortly before elections in 2001
there emerged two parties, which are now the two strongest actors on the Polish
political scene and at the same time respectively each others’ main political opponents –

\textsuperscript{2} However, it must be admitted that these researchers are fully aware that what we consider as the ‘top’ of
a candidate list depends on electoral system. For example, in a closed list systems, the candidate place on
the list reflects the position of the candidate in party hierarchy, but under open or semi-open lists, top
candidates have to be identified by preference votes. Candidate importance is even more difficult to assess
under single mandate districts, hence they suggest to look here at all candidates weighted by vote shares.
Finally, they postulate further research in order to operationalize congruence and scrutinize the index
under various electoral systems (Sikk and Köker 2010: 3, 10).
the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) and Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS).

In 2001 the electoral victory still belonged to the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD), the two above mentioned parties, the liberal Civic Platform and conservative Law and Justice obtained respectively 12.68% of votes (65 seats) and 9.5% of votes (44 seats). Such figures gave the Civic Platform second and the Law and Justice fourth place in terms of electoral results. In 2005 they already occupied the two top positions in the Polish parliament, alternating in the roles of government and main oppositional party to this day. In 2005 the Law and Justice won with 26.99% of the vote (155 seats) and formed a coalitional government with two smaller players – the Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, SRP) and the League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR). They gained respectively 11.41% of votes (56 seats) and 7.97% of votes (34 seats). Early elections in 2007 were won by the Civic Platform, which formed government with the Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL). Law and Justice came second with its two former coalitional partners failing to enter parliament at all.

In 2011 the Civic Platform won the general election and formed government for the second time in a row, which was an unprecedented event in the history of the Polish political system post democratic transition. In 2015 the electoral victory belonged to the Law and Justice party, which formed a single-party government. At least two reasons underlie the competition between these two parties and their domination of Polish politics since 2005 and contribute to the importance of this rivalry. Firstly, is the fact that these two parties once belonged to the so called ‘Solidarity’ political camp, which traced its roots back to the anti-communist democratic opposition. Their subsequent rivalry led to the formation of two distinct political groups, fiercely opposing each other now and thus creating a very intense political division in Poland (Markowski 2006: 831; Szczerbiak 2013). Secondly, this competition and the dominant position enjoyed by these two parties in Polish politics is interpreted as a factor not only stabilizing, but also one ‘freezing’ the contemporary party system in Poland (Szczerbiak 2013). Other factors which are also mentioned as conducive for the ‘freezing’ of the system are electoral thresholds: 5% for single parties and 8% for coalitions and also the fairly high thresholds of electoral support (3% for parties, 6% for coalitions) for budget subventions, which prevent smaller units being able to effectively challenge bigger and richer parties. However, Aleks Szczerbiak also mentions factors which speak against or at least weaken the ‘freezing’ idea: low election turnout or weak links between parties and their supporters (Szczerbiak 2013: 499). Those factors make for an electorate still

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3 Those two parties were present in the Polish Sejm also since 2001: Self-Defense with 10.22% votes (53 seats) and the League of Polish Families with 7.87% votes (38 seats) (Gwiazda 2009: 356).
accessible to possible newcomers. In fact such newcomers have appeared: in 2011 it was the Palikot Movement, a party created shortly before the elections, which entered the parliament criticizing the ‘duopoly’ of the PiS and the PO (Stanley and Cześnik 2016: 706). In 2015 two new actors were able to win parliamentary seats: the Modern Party of Ryszard Petru and Kukiz’15. Those three parties will be described in detail in a further part of the article.

3.1. Novelty of new parties

Till 2005 the main cleavage in Poland was that between post-communist and post-Solidarity forces (Grabowska 2004), then it gave way to a division between two roughly equal post-Solidarity camps – one organized around Law and Justice and the second around the Civic Platform. As far as the socio-economic issues are concerned they both should be considered as pro-redistributive, however the first more than the latter that tends to be more liberal. The difference is mainly in socio-cultural dimension. Whereas the first camp is conservative and nationalist-populist, the second is more centrist-liberal (Markowski 2016: 1316). It is interesting that these two camps are in compliance with the territorial division in Poland between south-eastern and north-western parts of the country. Whereas the first one is more inclined to support the nationalist-populist camp, the second votes for centrist-liberal option (Jańczak 2015: 127–128; Zarycki 2015: 121).

The three analyzed parties regarded here as new are different in terms of their programmatic stances; they are also located in different places on the political spectrum, ones based on both socioeconomic and socio-cultural divisions. Whereas the Palikot Movement and the Modern Party should be considered as liberal in socio-cultural dimension and pro-market in socio-economic one, Kukiz ’15 is much more conservative in the first dimension and presents economic nationalism in the second. However, what all these parties have in common is that they criticize the mainstream parties, especially the limitation of election competition to PiS and the PO and they present themselves as alternatives that are able to bring a new quality into Polish politics. They all pay attention to the inappropriate functioning of the state, including its repressiveness towards citizens and lack of transparency; an ailing legislative process and excessive bureaucracy, a badly functioning court system, corruption and nepotism. The mainstream political parties are perceived here to be the main culprits, hence some propositions are directed simply against them. Therefore, the newcomers advocate changes to the existing electoral system that should serve citizens, not political parties, and the abolishment of political party financing from public funds. A detailed analysis of
the suggested solutions goes beyond the scope of the study; hence we shall focus merely on the dimensions distinguished in the concept of Sikk and Köker (2017) and research the formations at the moment of their entering into parliament.

3.2. Party name and organization

The first dimension of the concept refers to organizational structure, including the party name; hence we shall start our examination from this point. The genesis of the Palikot Movement, Kukiz’15 and the Modern Party of Ryszard Petru was very similar: they were created from scratch by greater or lesser charismatic leaders and were thought of as useful tools that could serve their leaders to contest elections. The names of all the formations were entirely original including their leaders’ surnames. The organizational structures of the newly created parties were also new in the sense that it is not possible to point out any predecessors, however, it must be admitted that all Polish political parties have similar structures (Borowiec, Sobolewska-Myślik and Kosowska-Gąstoł 2016). This is partly due to the party law of 1997 that regulates basic principles concerning structures, partly because of the parties themselves that opt for similar organizational solutions.

Chronologically the first to emerge was the Palikot Movement, created shortly before the 2011 election and – in spite of common claims that the party system at the parliamentary level was ‘frozen’ – it was able to break through the electoral threshold and obtain 10.2% votes, giving the party 40 parliamentary seats. It is worth noting that its founder and leader Janusz Palikot had initially established an association: the Movement for Palikot Support, only later starting his first party: the Movement for Support. However, this party did not fulfil one of the legal obligations imposed on parties which is submission of financial statements before the end of March each calendar year, with the party running the danger of being banned. Palikot did not wait idly for the decision, but in the meantime established a new party – the Palikot Movement and with this formation contested the 2011 election. Two years later the party name was changed into Your Move(ment)5 (Twój Ruch, TR) in order to widen the electoral base.

The organizational structure of the Palikot Movement was initially based on the statute of 2011. This was composed of three levels: central, constituency and local (basic

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4 Detailed analyzes of the Palikot Movement and Kukiz’15 programs as well as parliamentary speeches of their MPs were presented at the ECPR conference in Hamburg in 2018 (Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2018).

5 The Polish word ruch means both ‘move’ in terms of initiative and ‘movement’ as an organizational structure, hence the party name can be translated differently incorporating this potential word play.
units called clubs). However, it must be admitted that the party was not able to create its structures across the entire country. In 2016 they existed in only 28 out of the 41 constituencies, while in 17 of these 28 they were not fully fledged.\(^6\) The party organization at the central level did not differ significantly from that of other parties. It was based simply on decision-making (Congress, Council, Committee) and executive (Board, Chairman) bodies (Statut RP 2011). The same structure was emulated at the lower levels; however, at the constituency level the Committee was lacking and at the club level there were only: the Congress (members meeting), the Board and the Chairman, hence the Committee and the Council were lacking if compared to the central level.

The change of the party name in 2013 was connected with the adoption of a new statute as well. This did not destroy the existing structure, though it did introduce some important changes. Firstly, an additional – regional level of party structure was created. Secondly, one of the central bodies – the Committee was removed from the statute and thereafter its existence was based on the regulation of the Board (Statut TR 2013). Both changes made the party structures more similar to other parties that are usually based on four levels and have two decision-making bodies at the central level. A more significant change related to organizational structure was accepted in the next party statute of 2015. In place of the hitherto Chairman two party leaders were introduced, a man and a woman; something that was in compliance with the party’s position on equal rights in all spheres of life regardless of sex (Statut TR 2015). However, it is worth mentioning that this document was adopted after the presidential election of 2015, when the party leader had suffered a painful defeat, and before the parliamentary one, hence the reform can be considered as rather instrumental and serving electoral purposes as well. The other change introduced by the statute’s amendments of 2015 was the abolishment of the party structure at the regional level; hence the formation was based on a three-level structure again. All in all, taking into account the Sikk and Köker operationalization of party newness, the Palikot Movement is a genuinely new formation, as it did not have any identifiable precursors in terms of both organizational structure and name, hence it should be assigned ‘zero’ in the first dimension.

Kukiz’15 was the name of an Electoral Committee of Voters, which is a legal form of electoral participation in Poland, designed for groups and individuals not being political parties. This Committee was organized by the supporters of Paweł Kukiz, a Polish rock musician who a few months earlier, in April 2015, had been a candidate in

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\(^6\) This means that in 11 constituencies there were only commissioners who – in accordance with the provisions of the statute – perform the functions of the constituency authorities until the first Congress of a constituency is convened. In a further 6 constituencies there were merely proxies who are appointed in the event of resignation of the chairman of the constituency (Twój Ruch 2016).
the presidential election in Poland. In this election Kukiz achieved a surprisingly good result, coming third, what encouraged him and his supporters to start in the parliamentary general election in the October. They won 8.81% of votes and 42 parliamentary seats; however, they have never decided to become a regular political party. Instead, in February 2016 they registered as the Association for a New Constitution Kukiz’15. This was a conscious decision, emphasizing its image as a protest movement, criticizing all political parties as corrupt and inadequate in their function of real representation. In everyday politics the Association is referred to as Kukiz’15, so far it still uses the original name.

The organizational structure of the Association for a New Constitution Kukiz’15 is described in its Statute (Statut Kukiz’15 2015). On the central level it has a decision-making body called the National Assembly of Delegates, the collective Executive Board and the Council of the Association, which is an advisory body to the Executive Board. The Association has a President, elected by the National Assembly of Delegates, but this is not a separate position, for it is included in the Statute as the President of the Executive Board. The Association has only one level below the central: this being the level of constituency. The organizational units on this level mirror the bodies at the national level. The basic structure is the circle, it is not specified whether the circles are territorial or may be organized on some other basis. The Association has its structures in almost all Polish constituencies, although the process of developing a territorial organization was quite long, lasting more than a year after the elections in 2015 (Ruch Kukiza 2016). Using Sikk and Köker operationalization of party newness, we rate it as ‘zero,’ a genuinely new unit, which did not base either its name or structures on any previously existing entity.7

The Modern Party of Ryszard Petru was created in 2015, a few months before the general election. It was started as an Association Modern.PL (Stowarzyszenie Nowoczesna.PL); the idea was to participate in public life as a think tank. However, a month later, during the founding Congress of the Association, the possibility to take part in elections was discussed with this possibility turning into the decision taken in July 2015, during the subsequent Congress in Gdańsk (Wilkowicz 2015; Deja 2015). At that Congress Ryszard Petru announced himself as a candidate for prime minister and regional coordinators were presented, whose role was to draw up electoral lists. In August 2015 the Modern Party of Ryszard Petru (Nowoczesna Ryszarda Petru) was registered as a political party. Under this name the party entered parliament in 2015, winning 7.6% of the votes and 28 parliamentary seats. The name of the party was

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7 In assessing Kukiz’15 as a genuinely new party it is important to recall that according to the self-definition of the subject it is not a regular political party, however we treat it as one, on the basis of Giovanni Sartori’s minimal definition of a party (2005) quoted at the beginning of the paper.
changed two years later, during the party Congress in November 2017. The name of the founder, Ryszard Petru, was dropped and the party’s name changed to the Modern Party (Nowoczesna) (onet.pl 2017). This change was due to the conflict within party elites, which resulted also in a change in leadership; something that will be described further on in the article.

According to the first statute of the party, its structure encompassed four levels: district, county, constituency and regional (voivodship) (Nowoczesna.org 2015). This structure was changed in the statute amended in August 2017 with the constituency level being dropped. In the new statute a chapter concerning the parliamentary group was added. The main party bodies at both central and regional level include collective decision-making bodies (Congress and Council) and executive bodies, both collective and one-person (Executive Board, Chairman). The basic party unit is the circle, the bodies on county level are limited to the relevant County Council and County Chairman. The last amendment of the statute was made during the party Congress in November 2017: in comparison to the August 2017 version, the main change concerned the party name, which was simplified to the Modern Party (Statut Nowoczesnej 2017). The party has structures in all 16 Polish voivodships. In assessing the level of novelty in terms of name and organization operationalized by Sikk and Köker, the Modern Party may be rated as ‘zero,’ as a genuinely new formation.

3.3. Party leader

The party leadership of the groupings under research is really crucial, firstly, because all three formations were created by their leaders and at least in the initial phase could be regarded as entrepreneurial parties, secondly they all criticized the party elites governing in Poland after the collapse of communism and presented themselves as people from outside of politics, who were able to bring a new quality to it. They wanted to be perceived as an alternative to the existing political forces, which were criticized for inept governance and accused of neglecting citizens’ interests. In this context it is interesting to consider whether the parties’ founders and at the same time their first leaders were truly new or they only claimed to be so. The Sikk and Köker concept (2017) perfectly fits here to assess the level of party leaders’ novelty, as it takes into consideration not only earlier party experience but also other forms of political involvement, for example holding political offices within the state.

As far as the leader of the Palikot Movement is concerned, before entering politics, he was a known businessman, the owner of wine (‘Amber’) and vodka (Polmos Lublin) producing holdings. Janusz Palikot belonged at that time to the richest people in Poland (Kocur and Majczak 2013: 44). By establishing a party and competing in the 2011 parliamentary election he wanted to be considered not a politician but an entrepreneur
who had entered politics, not because of money, as he was already rich, but just to fix the situation in the country. In his opinion quite new people were needed in politics because change was not possible merely by replacing certain party officials with others (Palikot 2010: 13). However, it must be admitted that at the moment of the party’s creation, its founder was not entirely new; for in a sense he was a part of the governing establishment, which is worth considering in detail.

Janusz Palikot started his political career in 2005 when he became a member of the Civic Platform (PO). In the same year he was elected from the party list to the Sejm, the lower but more influential chamber of the Polish parliament. In the early election of 2007 he retained his seat, becoming in 2009 also the chairman of the parliamentary committee ‘Friendly State,’ convened to propose improvements in the state’s functioning, especially the cutting of red tape (Palikot 2015). Palikot served also a vice-chairman of the PO parliamentary group. He was one of the most recognizable Polish politician (CBOS); however, this was not due to his parliamentary activity, but more to his critique of the existing elites and famous ‘happenings’ during which he used controversial props in order to draw attention to existing problems. People associated him mainly with his funny or shocking manifestations during press conferences when he would wave handcuffs, show a plastic penis and gun, drink vodka from miniatures or wear T-shirts with curious inscriptions. Even if the messages he aimed to convey in this way were really vital, the mass media and people in general focused mainly on the props (Kosowska-Gąstoł 2018: 137).

And here to such a point that by 2010 Janusz Palikot was a well-known political figure, however, his position in the party itself was not particularly strong (Palikot 2011: 188-198). This was visible mainly following the 2010 tragic plane crash in Smolensk (where 96 politicians and other public figures died) when Palikot accused the late president, Lech Kaczyński, of being responsible for the victims’ deaths. His utterance outraged even Civic Platform members, and with it being merely a matter of time before Palikot would be thrown out of the party, he decided not to wait for such an eventuality and left the Civic Platform himself in December 2010; resigning his parliamentary seat in January 2011 as well. Even though Janusz Palikot was the vice-chairman of the parliamentary group, the party did not perceive him as a part of its strict leadership, hence we have decided to assign him 0.5 in the second dimension of the Sikk and Köker framework related to party leader’s novelty (2017).

It is worth noting that – following the changes to the party statute – the party leadership was properly adjusted and in 2015 two co-leaders were elected. One of them became Janusz Palikot, the second seat went to a woman – Barbara Nowacka, hitherto

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8 This was discernible in particular from his electoral slogans: ‘It is not for the money that I am in politics’ (2011); ‘I will bring them to order’ (2015).
the chairperson of the think tank ‘Plan of changes’ connected to the party. They both led Your Move(ment) to the 2015 parliamentary election taking part within a broader coalition: the United Left (Zjednoczona Lewica, ZL), with Nowacka being the chairperson of its electoral committee as well. However, the coalition failed to cross the election threshold and found itself outside of parliament. Following the election Your Move(ment) has been hardly visible in the public sphere. In June 2017 Nowacka decided to give up party membership and to engage in the activities of ‘the Initiative Poland’ and the campaign ‘Let’s save women’ (Aktualności Twojego Ruchu 2017). In December Janusz Palikot announced on his blog that he is parting with politics (Palikot 2017). However, formally he is still party leader, with the co-leader still to be chosen.

Before gaining prominence as a politician, Paweł Kukiz was well known as a rock musician. He began his musical career in the 1980s, singing in alternative rock bands. He became professional in the 1990s, at that time also playing in several film roles (Stankiewicz 2015: 11-16). He studied law, though never finished his degree. His first political engagement dates to 1997, when he openly supported the Electoral Action ‘Solidarity’ (Stankiewicz 2015: 22). Later on, he supported Donald Tusk, the Civic Platform candidate, in the presidential election of 2005, taking part in the Committee for Support for Donald Tusk (Paweł Kukiz Biografia 2018). He was to continue his political involvement, supporting in 2007 the introduction of the Single Member Districts (SMD) into Polish electoral law, proposed then by the Civic Platform. The Civic Platform was to drop this idea, but Paweł Kukiz did not and later on it was to become one of his most well known political proposals. In 2012 he organized a civic initiative and the Internet site, closely connected to it, which demanded restoration of the lists of signatures, backing the SMD when it was still connected with PO and also demanded the introduction of the SMDs as such into the electoral system. This initiative was called ‘milled.pl’ (zmieleni.pl), the name alluded to the alleged destruction (milling) of the abovementioned lists of signatures.

In 2013 as the leader of the ‘milled.pl’ Kukiz took part in the initiative organized by the ‘Solidarity’ trade union called ‘The Platform of the Indignants.’ (Kosowska-Gąstoł and Sobolewska-Myślik 2017). Cooperation with ‘Solidarity’ did not continue; but Paweł Kukiz did not abandon his political engagement. In 2014 he became a councillor in the Regional Parliament of Lower Silesia (Sejmik Dolnośląski), representing the committee

9 It was social campaign that demanded the possibility of legal and safe abortion, providing pregnant women with full health care, access to modern methods of contraception and the introduction of sex education in schools. However, there was also the Citizens' Legislative Committee ‘Let’s save women 2017’ that was collecting signatures for the draft law on women’s rights and conscious parenthood.
of the Non-Partisan Self-Government Activists (Paweł Kukiz. Biografia 2018). In 2015 he decided to run in the Polish presidential election, winning 20.8% of the vote, coming third behind the current Polish president Andrzej Duda and the former president Bronisław Komorowski. This success inspired him and his supporters to take part in the forthcoming parliamentary election in October 2015. Paweł Kukiz became the symbol and leader of the Electoral Committee of Voters Kukiz’15, which was the basis for registering the Association for a New Constitution Kukiz’15 in February 2016. Paweł Kukiz is currently the President of the Executive Board of this Association, a member of parliament and the President of the parliamentary group Kukiz’15. He has been active in politics for quite a long time, however he was never fully engaged in any party, so in the dimension concerning leader novelty we have decided to assign him the value ‘zero.’

Moving on to the leader of the Modern Party, Ryszard Petru, it is worth noting that before starting a political career he had been publically well known as an economist. In the first decade of the new millennium he worked for the World Bank as an economist responsible for Poland and Hungary, in several Polish banks he occupied important positions such as the main economist or manager responsible for strategy. In 2014 he became the President of the Supervisory Board for the main Polish railway company, PKP, and at the Solaris Bus Coach Company; being also a member of supervisory boards in several other companies. In 2011, he became the Chairman of the Association of Polish Economists (Ryszard Petru. Biografia 2018). His political activity was less known, though its origins are some time ago. Ryszard Petru studied International Relations and was involved in politics already as a university student. In the 1990s, he worked as an assistant for Władysław Frasyniuk, MP of the Union for Freedom (Unia Wolności, UW), later working as a consultant for Leszek Balcerowicz (the leader of this party in 1995-2000), when the latter was a deputy prime minister and finance minister. Petru himself was a member of the Union for Freedom and in 2001 he ran for parliament though unsuccessfully (Ryszard Petru. Biografia 2018).

In April 2015, Ryszard Petru announced the creation of the Association Modern.PL (Stowarzyszenie Nowoczesna.PL) which later was to be transformed into the political party: the Modern Party of Ryszard Petru (Nowoczesna Ryszarda Petru), of which he became Chairman. In the winter of 2016 a serious parliamentary crisis took place in Poland, involving the occupation of the main hall of the Sejm parliamentary building by opposition MPs. During this crisis Petru flew to Portugal for New Year’s Eve; something that was to become a serious scandal in Polish politics and marked the beginning in a weakening of his position within the party. This situation resulted in his demise as party Chairman during the Congress in November 2017. During the same Congress, the party also changed its name, dropping the ‘Ryszard Petru’ part. Initially he declared that he would stay in the party, however several months later he left it and together with a few colleagues who had also left the Modern Party (Nowoczesna), created a new parliamentary club, which, according to the declarations of Ryszard Petru, is supposed
to be the root for a new political project (Tvp Info 2018). Taking into account Ryszard Petru’s political past, we decided to assign him the rating ‘zero’ in the dimension of leader novelty, for despite his previous political activity in the 1990s at the moment of the creation of the Modern Party he was not perceived as a professional politician, but an economist who had decided to engage in politics. The current chairperson of the Modern Party is Katarzyna Lubnauer, who had earlier served as its vice-chairperson.

3.4. Candidates selection

Each of the analyzed parties at the beginning of political activity was looking for candidates by the mobilizing of new people. Partly this was because they did not have any established and distinct pool of activists to choose from, and partly because in challenging ‘older’ parties they wanted to engage individuals not previously connected with them. Figures given by Sikk and Köker show that all three quite successfully performed this task. Bearing in mind that in the operationalization adopted in this article ‘one’ means that all candidates of a formation contested the previous elections with the same formation and ‘zero’ that none of the candidates did so, using the Sikk and Köker dataset, we should assign: 0.05 to the Palikot Movement, 0.09 to Kukiz’15 and 0.03 to the Modern Party (Sikk and Köker 2018: 19). Below we will discuss in greater detail the ways used by the analyzed parties to complete their electoral lists.

Starting with the Palikot Movement (Ruch Palikota) it must be admitted that the party took part in the parliamentary elections twice in 2011 and 2015 (already as Your Movement, Twój Ruch). However, in 2015 it was a part of a wider coalition: the United Left (Zjednoczona Lewica), thus the approach to candidate enrolment was the subject of agreements between those parties forming the coalition. Moreover, their electoral committee did not cross the electoral threshold and finally the party found itself outside of parliament. For these reasons we will focus merely on the 2011 election, when the Palikot Movement took part in the parliamentary election for the first time, issued electoral lists itself in all constituencies, and won 40 parliamentary seats.

As was said before, the party was established shortly before the election by Janusz Palikot, who left the Civic Platform and did not have any political backing, hence he was forced to create the electoral lists from scratch. He decided to make this weakness a

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10 It must be explained that whereas in the paper of 2017, where Sikk and Köker outlined their index of congruence/novelty, they gave a formation score ‘one’ when there was a complete congruence with the previously existed one and ‘zero’ when the formation was completely new, in their other paper (2018) they reversed the scale and assign ‘one’ to a completely new formation. In this way they ascribed: 0.95 to the Palikot Movement, 0.91 to Kukiz’15 and 0.97 to the Modern Party. Using the older scale of Sikk and Köker we had to rescale the scores.
force and he claimed he was against the placing on his party lists of well-known politicians. Instead, Palikot was in favour of finding young people, those born after the collapse of communism, as well as taking care of gender parity on the lists (gazeta.pl 2011). Finally, he managed to complete lists in all constituencies placing on them members of the Palikot Movement as well as many members of another party – the Reason of the Polish Left (Racja Polskiej Lewicy), some non-party candidates and individual members of the Democratic Party-democrats.pl (Partia Demokratyczna – demokraci.pl), the Polish Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe) and the Democratic Left Alliance (Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej) (Kandydaci Ruchu Palikota 2013: 311-332). Some of them were LGBT activists, others were connected with the initiative Free Hemp and the Campaign Against Homophobia. At the end of the candidates’ enrolment process, the party decided to open itself up to a broader public and everyone was invited to submit their own candidature by sending an e-mail to the party office in order to be taken into consideration as a party candidate. However, it is not known how many people were enrolled in this way and whether it really was a new way for enrolment or just a sort of marketing campaign designed to give the impression that the party was open to cooperation with all. All in all, the intention to create electoral lists consisting of new people, not incumbent politicians, must be considered as fully successful. This was also confirmed by the data gathered by Sikk and Köker (2017) that assigned the party a score close to ‘zero’ (to be exact 0.05) which means that almost all the candidates were new, and had not taken part in previous parliamentary election.

Moving on to Kukiz’15, it made an Internet appeal for potential candidates, who might apply using the Movement’s Internet site (wyborcza.pl 2015). Applicants were to fill in the specially designed form, answer questions about their personal situation (e.g., marital status, children, and financial situation), any previous political engagement or opinions on the issues which were emphasized in the electoral campaign by the Kukiz’15 Electoral Committee. This Internet appeal looked quite plausible, taking into account the fact, that Paweł Kukiz had built both his presidential and parliamentary campaigns by emphasizing his anti-system image, and stressing his effort to represent ‘ordinary people.’

It is difficult to say how many candidates actually applied by Internet, but looking at the final pool of candidates it seems that despite the effort to find candidates not previously politically active, the final lists included not only individual candidates with some political experience, but also more coherent groups with some political engagement. Most outstanding was the group of nationalist activists, members of the National Movement (Ruch Narodowy), a kind of umbrella organization for nationalist activists, which in November 2015, already after the election, was registered as a political party. Some candidates were connected with conservative-liberal NGOs or small parties such as the Republican Foundation (Fundacja Republikańska), the Congress of the New Right (Kongres Nowej Prawicy), the KoLiber Association (Stowarzyszenie
KoLiber). There were also several candidates who had previously engaged in promoting single member districts, prominent activists of the anti-communist opposition such as a leader of ‘Fighting Solidarity’ (Solidarność Walcząca), Kornel Morawiecki, several activists of Polish local government, including members of districts councils (Sawicka et al. 2015). However, those candidates did not belong to any party which may be considered to be a political predecessor of Kukiz’15; they did not stand as candidates in the previous parliamentary election as well, thus we may attribute a score close to ‘zero’ to Kukiz’15 in terms of the level of candidate novelty. According to the Sikk and Köker dataset, rescaled in compliance with the operationalization made in this article, it is 0.09.

The Modern Party built its structures as well as recruited candidates for elections mostly by the activity of local coordinators, who were introduced at the party Congress in Gdańsk (Deja 2015). Kamila Gasiuk-Pihowicz, one of the first activists of the Modern Party in talking about party candidates said that the party would look for active people, but not notorious candidates from other parties. In talking about herself, she admitted that she had been active some time previously in the Youth Organization of the Union for Freedom (Młodzieżówka Unii Wolności), however later on had not engaged in any party activity (Dąbrowska 2015). Łukasz Goździor, coordinator for the Wielkopolska Region also declared that the party would not attract ‘party hoppers’ i.e., people changing parties and trying to get elected from various party lists and instead would look for professionals such as businessmen, lawyers, medical doctors or teachers (Nyczka 2015). The same strategy was declared by Jerzy Meysztowicz, coordinator for the Małopolska Region, however in his case one has to remember that he himself was active and even a prominent member of the Democratic Union (Unia Demokratyczna, UD), the Union for Freedom (Unia Wolności, UW), the Democratic Party-democrats.pl (Partia Demokratyczna-demokraci.pl) and the Civic Platform (wyborcza.pl 2015a; Jerzy Meysztowicz. Biografia 2018). Katarzyna Lubnauer, the current chairperson of the Modern Party, was engaged in politics as a member of the Democratic Union and the Union for Freedom, she was also a district councillor in Łódź (Katarzyna Lubnauer. Biografia 2018). The founder of the party, Ryszard Petru, was also a member of the Union for Freedom and unsuccessfully ran for parliament as a candidate of this party in 2001 (Ryszard Petru. Biografia 2018). Several candidates had in the past served as district councillors (Joanna Scheuring-Wielgus. Biografia 2018; wyborcza.pl 2015a). So, it may be concluded, that candidates of the Modern Party were not all new to politics. However, most of the candidates of the Modern Party at the moment of the election in 2015 did not belong to any political party (PKW 2015) and they had not been candidates in the previous parliamentary election in 2011, which is also shown by the figure quoted by Sikk and Köker (2018). They assigned the Modern Party a score close to zero, to be exact 0.03. Former activity on the part of some Modern Party members in the Democratic Union, the Union for Freedom, or the Civic Platform can be interpreted as a
continuity of political views, which in the case of the Modern Party is not denied, but widely known (Szacki 2015).

Conclusion

In presenting the new parties which were formed in Poland after 2011, i.e., the Palikot Movement, the Association for a New Constitution Kukiz’15, and the Modern Party, we wanted to find out whether they were genuinely new political actors. In our opinion this is important because in Central and Eastern European countries new parties are often regarded as merely the effect of changes and reshufflings within existing political elites and thus cannot present a genuinely new offer for voters or supporters, something that is often vividly described as ‘old wine in new wineskins.’ In order to answer the question as to whether the analyzed parties are really new and to what extent they are new, we have used the framework elaborated by Sikk and Köker (2017). According to our findings the rating of party novelty on a scale from ‘zero’ (meaning a completely new party) to ‘one’ (continuation in terms of the party name, organization, leadership and candidates for parliamentary election) in each case is below 0.2. Therefore, we have proven that all three analyzed parties should be regarded as completely new.

Comparing these parties, we have shown that at the moment of their creation the level of novelty was highest in the case of the Modern Party, Kukiz’15 should be placed next, after the Modern Party, with the Palikot Movement at the end (bar graph 1). The Modern Party was completely new as far as party name and organization went (ranked ‘zero’) as well as party leadership (ranked ‘zero’). Their candidates for parliamentary election were also new, the ranking is here close to ‘zero’ (exactly 0.03). This means that the average level of novelty for this formation is 0.01. The scores for Kukiz’15 are very similar, we have ascribed ‘zero’ in the first and second dimensions and 0.09 in the third one. The average score for this formation is 0.03. The level of novelty seems to be smallest in the case of the Palikot Movement. We have assigned this party ‘zero’ in the first dimension, and 0.5 and 0.05 in the second and third respectively. Hence the average score for the party is 0.18. This is mainly due to the fact that the party leader was not completely new to politics, he was well-known earlier as a politician of the Civic Platform. However, in the other dimensions the party was almost completely new. To sum up, we can conclude that all three analyzed parties at the moment of their entering parliament were genuinely new entities within the Polish party system.
Bar graph 1. The level of parties’ novelty (1 – perfect congruence, 0 – perfect novelty)

Source: Developed by the authors on the base of the research

The other conclusion which may also be drawn from our research concerns the phenomenon of the so-called ‘duopoly’ in Polish politics, which is related to the long lasting rivalry between the Law and Justice and the Civic Platform parties, which prevents new parties from gaining political relevance (Szczerbiak 2013). The emergence of three parties able to gain parliamentary seats shows that this ‘duopoly’ is not as ‘rigid’ as it may be perceived, hence new entrants into Polish politics are still possible.

However, apart from these conclusions, our analysis points to certain questions and problems which should be the subject of further research. Firstly, it needs to be borne in mind that the Sikk and Köker framework (2017) encompasses only three dimensions: party name and structure, leadership and candidate selection. Even if the parties are new in all of them, they may not be new in others. In our opinion more dimensions should be taken into consideration in order to fully assess the level of party newness, hence further research is needed, including party programmatic stances (new ideology) and electorate flows (new voters). Secondly, the case of the Palikot Movement, which after one parliamentary term of office has almost disappeared, shows that it seems important to be able to identify both factors conducive to new parties chances of entry, and their chances of survival.

Those questions are often asked and researched using the large sets of data, mainly from advanced democracies. However, in our opinion a closer look at particular cases
may be also useful, giving a rich picture of not only the parties themselves, but also the particular political context in which they function. There are some findings indicating that the emergence of new parties is associated with the cost of registering a party, the possibilities to be funded from public sources, the permissiveness of the electoral institutions, the maturity of the democracy itself etc. (Tavits 2006: 141). In turn, the findings related to parties’ capacity to sustain electoral support and hence their chances of survival, point to party origin, time for party building and leadership continuity (Bolleyer and Bytzek 2017: 772). Nevertheless, only analyzes of party specific factors, such as ideological location (and continuity or change in this matter) can bring us closer to a full understanding of new party emergence and survival and hence understanding party system change and stability in general. To this end we propose to develop the Sikk and Köker’s index of political party’s congruence/novelty by adding new dimensions to it, mainly the issue of programmatic changes and shifting of party electoral base. It’s also worth considering to combine this framework with the concept of Shlomit Barnea and Gideon Rahat (2010) in order to get more complex tool for assessment of party novelty.

References


