Hegel in a postcolonial world: Populist authoritarianism, postcolonialism, and the master–slave dialectic

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Abstract
The paper seeks to offer a Hegelian-inspired normative explanation of the utilization of postcolonial arguments by authoritarian states to challenge Western norms. In the last decades, several authoritarian politicians like Modi and Erdoğan have used postcolonial concepts to justify a range of questionable essentialist and nationalistic policies of new imperialism. Whereas scholars and policymakers have identified this phenomenon as pragmatic manoeuvring by politicians, they have failed to either incorporate the role of the West in their analysis or explain the efficiency of this rhetoric within national contexts. The previously successful practice of retreating to universal Western norms has become impractical due to the overall lack of consensus on existing social hierarchies and Western values. Since the increasingly popular practice appears as a contextual epiphenomenon of a globalized issue, broader frameworks are required to make sense of these increasing distortions of postcoloniality. As such, the paper argues for a Hegelian approach that positions the West/Europe and the populist authoritarian states in a master–slave dialectic. The dialectic offers a normative and rational reading of this problematic postcolonial phenomenon, one that not only shows the past and contemporary circumstances of its formulation but also helps us eliminate or, more realistically, understand the phenomenon. It also incorporates in the analysis the role of domestic factors and the inter-subjective influence of the West/Europe on the formulation of a postcolonial identity and discourse. Furthermore, the paper argues that populist and authoritarian governments do not manage to overcome the master–slave dialectic but instead exploit it to maximize their political gains. Hence, after placing Hegel’s master–slave dialectic in the international relation corpus, the paper uses a dialogical model to examine the Turkish Justice and Development Party’s postcolonialist colonialism and show the benefits of the master–slave dialectic in analysing the phenomenon.

Keywords
Hegel, postcolonial world, populist authoritarianism, postcolonialism, master–slave dialectic

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1. Introduction

Following the end of WWII, the expansion of the international system and creation of modern liberal order resulted in the formulation of “postcolonial anxieties” in countries of the third world. Faced with the task of creating a postcolonial subjectivity in a globalized world, these political entities shaped varying manifestations of agency and formulated different motivations and national narratives (Chowdhury 2018; Jabri 2014: 375). However, over the last decades, these pre-existing paradigms and postcolonial identities have begun to dissolve, thus resurfacing the need to develop criticisms for the variety of (post)-colonial presents (Jabri 2014: 375). Therefore, it has slowly become apparent that it is impossible to understand the consequences of the international system’s evolution without discussing issues of empire, imperialism, and colonialism (Keene 2002; Suzuki 2009).

An interesting current manifestation of this phenomenon is the abuse of postcolonial presents, mostly in the form of postcolonial discourse, by populist authoritarian leaders across the world (e.g., Vladimir Putin in Russia, Narendra Modi in India, or Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey). Although not unprecedented, the abrupt intensification of this practice has risen normative and methodological concerns among postcolonial scholars. While the used postcolonial arguments are based on historical and empirical facts, they have been, however, politicized and distorted to serve the imaginary, interests, and discourse of the authoritarian leaders (Epstein 2017). Still, regardless of the political and social context, the target of this postcolonial discourse remains the same: the West/Europe, the values associated with liberalism, and the Western institutions.

As the paper shows, the populist leaders are exploiting the ongoing economic inequalities, the exclusion of the third world from important international institutions, and the shaky foundations of the Western liberal order (see Hadiz and Chrysoggelos 2017). They are also taking advantage of the Western interventionism in third world politics and recent disruptions in Western liberal order (e.g. the 2008 financial crisis in the US or waves of populism across European and the US) that have created the perception of a rising ideological discrepancy (Herzog 2021: 1). As such, populist leaders have sought to fill this vacuum with their takes or criticism on Western universality and fuel the pre-existing “postcolonial anxieties” to promote their agendas and justify authoritarian domestic measures. To achieve the latter, they many times use postcolonial discourse; a leitmotif that remains highly unexamined by postcolonial scholars and political theorists.

To understand the roots and driving forces behind the employment of faulty postcolonialities, the paper argues for the induction of an already existing tool in its analysis, G.F.W. Hegel’s master and slave dialectic. Although Alan Badiou (2017: 43) argues this tool is capable of offering only a partial understanding of historical slavery, it could offer a broader framework for the delineation of the temporal and ontological
insecurities facilitating the employment of postcolonial arguments by contemporary populist leaders (see Hirvonen and Pennanen 2018). The growing popularity and similarities among these manifestations indicate that they are contextual epiphenomena of a globalized issue, as indicated by Charlotte Epstein (2017), thus creating a need for epistemological innovation and broader frameworks making sense of this increasing distortion of postcoloniality. It also enables the comprehension of the role of the domestic factors and the inter-subjective influence of the West/Europe in the formulation of the postcolonial identity and corresponding discourse. Specifically, the application of the master-slave dialectic offers a normative and rational reading of these problematic postcolonial presents that shows not only the past and contemporary circumstances behind its formulation but also provides the way for its dissolution or more realistically, its understanding. Contrary to strictly empirical, pragmatic, and historiographical approaches, it constitutes a self-reflective tool capable of explaining the complex international social phenomenon in an epistemologically exhaustive and methodologically coherent manner (MacKay and Levin 2018: 75–80).

Having positioned the master-slave dialectic in the contemporary debate, the paper shows the benefits of its use to analyse postcolonial abuses through the case of AKP’s “postcolonial colonialism,” as demonstrated in the works of Zeynep Gülşah Çapan and Ayşe Zarakol (2017). Indeed, Erdoğan’s postcoloniality is based on the structural and temporal insecurities stemming from the position of a ‘non-Western self’ (Çapan and Zarakol 2019). While the AKP initially attempted to gain permanent recognition from the West/Europe, the inability of its achievement pushed the party to develop a faulty and self-imposed post-colonial free self-consciousness based on its Ottoman legacy, Islamic religion, and “colonized” identity. This consciousness has been skilfully utilized by the AKP to justify the growing domestic populism and democratic violations and to promote ambitious policies in the close region.

The article also takes notes of the domestic (e.g., Kemalism), structural (the Western interventions in the Middle East), and temporal insecurities (e.g., the 2016 coup d’état) that facilitated the emergence and establishment of this faulty postcolonial identity and narrative. Yet, it argues that AKP’s endeavour does not aim to “liberate” Turkey from the existing ontological and structural inequalities. Although the AKP acknowledged its “fragility’ and “[its] chain from, which [it] could not, in the struggle, get away” (Hegel 1979: 405), it does not aim to transcend its immediacy and develop truly postcolonial self-consciousness independent from the West/Europe. Instead, it will continue to use its postcolonial subjectivity to foster state cohesion, employ polarizing discourse, and fuel the increasing internal populism.
2. The master and slave dialectic

Before proceeding with the academic debate, the paper offers a brief overview of the Hegelian master-slave dialectic, which will be further elaborated in the case study. Contrary to David Hume’s atomistic unity or Immanuel Kant’s universality, Hegel considers that the process of knowing and formulating subjectivity relies intrinsically on the suppression or conquering of the Otherness. As such, in the first stage, each consciousness is mostly abstract and subjective (each self-consciousness sees itself as the measure of all things) and manifests the desire (Begierde) to collide with an external object to achieve objectivity (Hegel 1974: 426).

By colliding with the Other, each consciousness loses “its own self, since it finds itself as another being” (Hegel 1974: 426). As such, they seek to monopolize and sublate each other as they view the Other as an “unessential, negatively characterized object” (Hegel 1974: 426). However, this confrontation does not offer the permanent recognition necessary for the transcendence of immediacy and corporeity (Lieblichkeit) because it can only be achieved through a reciprocal recognition of “what they essentially are, namely, beings who are not merely natural but free” (Hegel 1974: 431). This reciprocity lies also at the core of the accomplishment of freedom and comprises the foundation of the master-slave dialectic. But, this willingness to overcome their own immediacy and that of the Other-self forces them also to a “fight of recognition [and universalism] (...) [and] a life and death struggle” (Hegel 1974: 433).

Given the destructive nature of the dialectic, the initial result of this struggle is a one-sided negation. This outcome induces a conundrum: while the one combatant prefers life and to retain his/her single self-consciousness, but he surrenders his/her claim for recognition; the other holds fast to his/her self-assertion and is recognized by the former as his/her superior (Singer 2001: 79). This uneven symbiosis is the second stage of the dialectic, where the master has transcended the barest immediacy and materiality and the slave has the role of the subordinate because of his inability to achieve the same (Hegel 1967: 433). Despite achieving the monopoly over the slave's consciousness and his/her recognition, the master cannot gain full self-consciousness due to the servant status of the Other. Instead, he/she chooses the immediate joy and rudimentary satisfaction offered by the slave’s products and recognition. Nevertheless, by working (Arbeit) for the master, the slave transforms his/her own self (Bildung), and, thus, becomes conscious of his/her own being (Hegel 1967: 435).

Eventually, each consciousness attains freedom and universal self-consciousness. Both the master and slave embody the two paths to freedom: the transcendence of egotism and immateriality (Hegel 1967: 436). By becoming identical with their subjectivity, the two consciousness enter the third stage of the dialectic, which is also its resolution. Interestingly, through mutual recognition, the two consciousnesses start to formulate a shared Universality (Allgemeinheit) and Reason (Vernunft).
3. The dialectic of the Western universalism and Empire

The master-slave dialectic of Hegel has a vexed relationship with contemporary academia. Whereas prominent political thinkers such as Franz Fanon and Alejander Kojève have critically engaged with the concept to discuss issues of global history and colonialism, the emergence of poststructuralist and postcolonial criticism highlighted the intrinsically Eurocentric and totalizing mindset of the dialectic (e.g., the lack of positioning of Africa in the framework of the overall philosophy of history) and managed to paint it as deeply problematic and in need of reconstruction (see Said 1980; Prabhu 2005; Bernasconi 2003; Chakrabarty 2009; Moellendorf 1992). At the same time, prominent political thinkers started attacking the dialectical method itself or its components. Similar to the postmodernists, Karl Popper, one of the 20th century's most influential philosophers of science, criticized the Hegelian dialectic for its intrinsic historicism and willingness to put up with contradictions (Popper 1963: 335). In chapter 12 of volume 2 of “The Open Society and Its Enemy,” he went to the extent to connect Hegelian dialectics with the rise of fascism in Europe by contributing to the identification of might and right, encouraging thus totalitarian modes of thought (Popper 1963). As such, it is not surprising the lack of dialectic analysis in the postcolonial canon and the overall exclusion of Hegelian-inspired frameworks in contemporary academia (Stone 2020).

In the last decades, a group of scholars has emerged seeking to do what Fayaz Chagani (2013), describes as working “through” Hegel, a movement that relies on both the revision and reintroduction of “Hegelianisms” within the modern context and academic debate. Set on the works of Franz Fanon and Alexander Kojève, scholars, including Vincent Descombes and Robert Young, have also recognized that Hegel's dialectic features at the centre of the fierce debates that are still raging within postcolonial and global studies regarding historiography, the nature of globalization, and the idea of universality (see Habib 2017: 140). This revival of dialectics in the field also affected other Hegelian associated notions, like the master-slave dialectic. The latter began to be viewed as a useful prism to make sense of exclusionary othering, especially in the postcolonial global order, present in the international and social institutions to maintain modern forms of oppression and power relations in the shared inter-subjectivity (Crossley 1996).

Scholars have also sought to apply the master-slave dialectic to address contemporary servitude, domination, and recognition issues (see Buck-Morss 2009; Cole 2014; Aching 2012; Kwon 2006; Maher 2014). Apart from that, the works of Alan Badiou (2017) and Andreja Novakovic (2017) have helped to further the understanding regarding the role of desire and participative cultural production (Bildung) in the formulation of master and slave's self and desires. Others, such as Shannon Brincat (2010) have proved that Hegelian dialectics can be shaped into a theoretical tool to study world
politics, utilized more broadly in the discipline, and deployed critically as part of an emancipatory project.

In line with the aforesaid works, the paper aims to contribute to the academic debate by showing the benefits of a master-slave dialectic as a prism for the analysis of the contemporary abuses of postcolonial presents by populist leaders. Opposing solely pragmatic and empirical approaches, this theoretical framework offers a normative and empirical reading of this newly emerged phenomenon. Due to the binary basis of the populist use of postcolonial arguments (us-vs-them or enemy/foe distinction), the dialectic provides a truly postcolonial reading of the roots of this practice, which takes into consideration the roles of the systemic insecurities and the West/Europe in its emergence.

In parallel, it helps delineate the impact of domestic and external forces on the subjectivity and behaviour of the metaphorical slave. It also offers a framework that explains why these postcolonial abuses find fertile ground in the population by showcasing how populists exploit the ontological and temporal insecurities, stemming from this dialectical relationship, to establish a worldview where the West/Europe serves as the enemy. Within the context of the case study, it could offer interesting insights and answers to questions like: Why did the Turkish model fail? Why has Turkey reintroduced elements of a pre-colonial subjectivity? Why is Turkey targeting the West/Europe? Nevertheless, it is important to note that the paper does not argue for a totalizing theory and explanation of Turkey's abuses of postcolonial presents; instead, it recommends a Hegelian prism, which can contribute to a better comprehension of the phenomenon and act supplementary to other similar studies (see Çapan and Zarakol 2017, 2019).

4. Method and structure

The paper uses a case study to test qualitatively whether empirical evidence support (or does not support) a theory’s proposition (Dul and Hak 2007). As the goal of the research is to present the advantages of the induction of the master-slave dialectic in postcolonial studies, a single case study will help to demonstrate the utility and possible shortcomings of such an approach when examining a specific and new phenomenon like the abuse of postcolonial presents. Notably, this reflective tool does not seek to offer a grand theory but only investigates the praxis and forces behind the emergence of this “postcolonial colonialism.”

Contrary to the “theory-first” approach, this research adopts a dialogic engagement between theory and case study. The rationale behind the selection is two-fold: a) theory infuses all the aspects of the research, including identification of the case or the presentation and interpretation of findings; b) the case study can have implications for the development of the theory (Rule and John 2015: 7). Indeed, the master-slave dialectic is a dynamic and reflective tool that relies on a constant backward and forward
motion between the master and the slave. As such, a dialogical approach achieves to present simultaneously the case study itself and the findings contrapuntally to the theory itself, thus offering a contextually sensitive and theoretically astute framework.

When it comes to the structure, it is rather straightforward and defined by the theoretical framework used in this research. Considering that Hegel divides the master-slave dialectic into three stages, the paper follows the same rationale behind the analysis of the case study. Specifically, the dialectic has three stages of development: 1) Desire, where self-consciousness is directed at things other than itself; 2) Master-slave, where the self-consciousness is directed at another that is unequal to itself. Although there is a third stage, this is not the case for the phenomenon of postcolonial abuses. As the paper shows, the inability to achieve the third stage is abused by the authoritarian populist governments which instead, seek to prolong the master-slave dialectic and benefit from this relationship on both the domestic and external levels.

5. The roots of Turkey’s postcolonial anxiety

Historically, Turkey has never been colonized by European powers. However, as Zarakol (2011) highlights, the uneven relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Europeans parallel colonial dynamics in many ways, from the nineteenth century onwards. After the end of World War I, being colonizable and perfect for expansion to the East, the previously Ottoman territories stirred up antagonism among the contemporary great power and their allies (Britain, Italy, Greece, and Russia). The imposed subaltern identity and the danger of permanent occupation resurfaced Turkey’s pre-existing ontological insecurities, hence prompting internal forces led by Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk), the leader of the Turkish National Movement, to try to stop the state’s partition in 1919 (Zürcher 1993).

After a two-year war, the Turkish forces managed to defeat the forces sent by allies in the Turkish War of Independence and compel them into accepting the creation of the secular Turkish state in 1923. Interestingly, Kemal used anti-colonial as well as anti-imperialist arguments targeting mostly the British forces to fan winds of solidarity (Zarakol 2011: 125–135, 148). This discourse positioned the occupying forces as the Other which is a negation of the Turkish subjectivity and needs to be overcome, hence setting the foundations for Turkey’s postcolonial anxiety. Although these verbal attacks did not last long, it was the first indication of Turkish problematic relations with its Other—the West.

Soon after its creation, Turkey began to present the country and Turks as European, white, and modern while de-emphasizing the similarities between Turkey and other countries under colonial or mandate rule (Zarakol 2011: 141–159). Seeking to join the international community, Kemal began to construct a new identity for the newly emerged Turkish state, one that could guarantee the survival and the recognition of the
European powers (Çağaptay 2002, 2004; Uzer 2002). As such, on the domestic level, he decided to replace the pre-existing subjectivity with Kemalism, a synthesis of European and Ottoman elements. Given the divergences between European secularism with the Ottoman “millet” structure, Kemal focused on a selective synthesis favouring an enforced Westernization and secularization of Turkey. Kemal’s revisionism relied on attacking the old Ottoman order and introducing a series of reforms based on the six main principles namely republicanism, populism, nationalism, laicism, statism, and reformism (Alaranta 2011: 8). This revisionism is a typical example of “false monolithic modernity, whereas the “conservative democracy” of moderate Islam represents a supposedly more mature, pluralistic approach to modernity” (Alaranta 2017).

Kemal’s efforts eventually proved capable of establishing both a new Turkish identity recognized by the West (see: the serious proposals for including Turkey in the League of Nations Mandate system) and Turkish inter-subjectivity in the international global system, stuck in the duality between East and West. Yet, despite its initial successes in bringing Turkey closer to “Western modernity”, it did not manage to spur Turkey into the Western sphere of influence in the end. This development caused an internal crisis regarding Turkey’s identity and forced the political elite to question its Western affiliation, thus paving the way for social and cultural projects challenging the secularist “Kemalism” proposed by the old subject class (Onis 1995). It became apparent that Kemalism did not manage to negate the pre-existing Ottoman/Islamist consciousness, which was radically sublated to accomplish the main Kemalist ideology. Hence, Turkey experienced the resurfacing of the Ottoman legacy and the “Islamization of the nation” at the beginning of the 1990s (Karakas 2007: 2).

The resurgence of Turkish fundamentalism and the re-induction of Ottoman elements in the political, cultural, and social domains of Turkish society is referred to as Neo-Ottomanism. The forbearers of Neo-Ottomanism were the 8th Turkish President, Turgut Özal (1989–1993), and the academic Ahmet Davutoğlu, who would later become one of the architects of the modern foreign policy and claimed that Turkey is destined to become a regional hegemon, merging geographic determinism with cultural agency and Turkey’s historical experience (Davutoğlu 2001). Neo-Ottomanism was supported by robust Islamic sentiment and discourse that proved to be beneficial for the integration of religious movement in mainstream Turkish politics and the emergence of politicians with strong Islamic backgrounds, such as Erdoğan (Yavuz 2003: 62). Interestingly, the crisis of Kemalism coincided with the collapse of the Turkish Western/European perspective, hence unveiling the dialectic relation between the two political and ideological entities (Kadioğlu 1998: 55).

2 While external interpretations of Neo-Ottomanism are reduced to a euphemism for Turkey’s increasingly “anti-Western” political orientation, this is not entirely the case as is phenomenon has little to do with the West and reflects much more about the emerging ideological model in Turkey.
The end of the Cold War further accelerated Turkey’s turn from the West/Europe as the state found itself not able to escape the ambivalent relations: the West/Europe continued to view it more as a bridge between the East and the West and less like a participant in the liberal Western order (Ahiska 2010: 16). The realization that the collision between two autonomous selves (Eastern and Western identities) can be only overcome by moving from one to the other (from the East to the West) and leaving behind what is traditional to become modern, resulted in a growing resentment towards the West (Ahiska 2010: 18). This “anger” fuelled the pre-existing ontological insecurity of Turkey, which started experiencing again its subaltern identity. It also set the fundamentals for the enemy/foe relation and a worldview based on rejection and emulation of the West/Europe that Erdoğan has brilliantly utilized for his rise and eventual populist abuse of postcolonial presents (Zarakol 2019: 271–272).

### 6. AKP: The first term and the moment of reflection

Founded just a year before, the AKP accomplished to utilize the Turkish population’s resentment against the governing bodies amid the 2001 financial crisis to sweep the 2002 elections (Yimaz 2018). The party took the reins under the leadership of Abdullah Gül, with the party leader Erdoğan being disallowed to serve in parliament or as prime minister due to a 1998 conviction (a constitutional amendment in late 2002 removed this obstacle). For the Turkish population, the AKP signalized a positive change from the stagnated pre-existing political order. As Çapan and Zarakol (2019: 273) point out, the AKP was “supposed to have reconciled democracy and Islam, capitalism and conservatism, progress and tradition, overcoming the binaries that created dissonance for the modern Turkish identity throughout the twentieth century.” In lieu of the old Kemalist order, the AKP would make Turkey a regional power and guarantee the respect of the international community. Nonetheless, although its reformist Islamic roots (e.g., its core was formed by the Islamist Virtue Party), it avoided challenging the pre-existing longstanding secular Kemalism during its first term. Instead, it continued to act in line with its image of a moderate Islamist party and merge between tradition and progress, which initially led to its election (Cornell 2008).

AKP’s win caused ambivalent reactions in the West: while others perceived it as the manifestation of the will of the Turkish population, others feared the end of Turkey’s Western orientation associated with the pre-existing Kemalist political order (The Economist 2002). These concerns were soon dismissed when the party proved to be more pro-Western than the Kemalists themselves. Despite the previous anti-Western and national discourse in 2001, the big internal economic problems and the need for external funding (mostly from the United States) pushed the AKP toward the adoption of a more pro-Western, pro-American, and pro-liberal economy stance (Zağlıyan-İçener 2009). Indeed, during the first term, the AKP began talks with Europe regarding Turkey’s
accession to the European Union (EU) in 2005. This disruption with its prior nationalist discourse resulted in Turkish secularists accusing Erdoğan of selling Turkey out to imperialism. Indicatively, in 2007, one of Turkey's best-selling books was titled “Moses’ Children” and it declared Erdoğan to be a “crypto-Jew” colluding with the Elders of Zion (Akyol 2015).

From a Hegelian perspective, the AKP’s moderate approach could be interpreted as its reflection stage (Widerschein). Similar to Kant, Hegel considers reflection as logic’s opening out to nature and the shift from the finite to the infinite (Miller 2019: 202). The object’s capacity thus to be conscious of some external object as something distinct from oneself requires the reflexivity of self-consciousness (Casteneda 1989: 90). In other words, to enter the dialectical process, the object (AKP) needs to understand what it is and what separates it from the other (Kemalism and other regional powers). Hence, the AKP needed to develop both a new subjectivity and narrative for its approach to international and regional affairs, but always different than the Kemalist pre-existing one.

This task posed a challenge for the party, as it enjoyed neither absolute legitimacy nor the means to proceed with policies matching its revisionist discourse (see Onis 2006; Oğuzlu and Özpek 2008). Being a newly founded and relatively unknown party, AKP lacked both the authority to push forward forcefully its policies and mandate from the Turkish people. So, it had to rely on balancing and satisfying the internal and external elements (Hegel 1967: 344). For (the then) Turkey, this satisfaction relied on the attainment of economic resources, popularity, and disruption from the a priori pathological elements (Hegel 1967: 302). Hence, the AKP continue to criticize Kemalism for its “unhealthy” affiliation to the West, but at the same time, it ingested the values and practices of West/Europe to become finite (see Özel 2015).

Such interpretation could also explain the AKP’s approach to internal Kemalist elements. The party’s tolerance could be interpreted as a means for the construction of subjectivity through a conceptual differentiation between reflexive self-differentiation and undifferentiated identity constructed as a “difference from difference” (Werner 1970: 183–194). Putting it simply, Kemalism served the AKP as the Other, necessary for the construction of a new-found and divergent identity and modus operandi for Turkey and the party. Yet, the attainment of freedom is not in a Fichtean manner trapped by one self’s subjectivity; instead, it comes with social struggle and reciprocity. However, as another crucial and controversial German philosopher and Hegel’s successor, Carl Schmitt highlights plurality leads to antagonism and conflict (Schmitt 2007: 44). Hence, being part of the Turkish state governance and identity, the AKP would eventually end up portraying Kemalism as the Other that it needs to overcome.
7. First stage: Desire and the first encounter of the two consciousnesses

The first stage of self-consciousness is desire (*Begierde*) whereby the consciousness (upon its formulation) is directed toward some external object to satisfy its appetite for recognition (Hegel 1974: 426). Being merely an abstract, the consciousness archives objectivity by taking possession of the object and consuming it, thus making this stage “destructive and selfish.” To transcend their immediacy and corporeity (*Lieblichkeit*), the two beings meet to gain the required recognition of another independent existence: however, they become aware that they can only be for themselves and seek monopoly and certainty of oneself (Hegel 1974: 431). Still, a subject achieves self-consciousness through the bringing of the other under its control, or in Hegel’s words by “sublating this other that presents itself to him as self-subsistent life” (Hegel 1967: 109). As such, the two consciousness perceive the Other as unequal and negative objects and seek to manipulate them to achieve certainty through sublation.

As desire forces the subject out of itself into the world to become conscious of itself, it is important to locate the point that set AKP’s desire in motion, thus initiating the dialectic process. The paper argues that it was the attainment of legitimacy that enabled the monopolization of authority by the AKP. In 2007, the party won the elections and secured the mandate from the Turkish population for the continuance of its policies. AKP’s higher degree of legitimacy and internal recognition translated into a more ambitious and revisionist second term. Not surprisingly, after 2007, the AKP sought to consolidate and monopolize the power through the adoption of political reforms weakening rival political institutions and Kemalist elements in the governance while targeting the “fourth estate” and the military by jailing military officers, journalists, and opposition lawmakers (Somer 2017: 1030; Ekim and Kirisci 2017; Rodrik 2011: 99–108).

Contrary to the past, the party did not require Kemalism to become finite or define itself; instead, it began to view it as an unequal and negatively characterized object that needed to be sublated. Despite the initial co-existence, this development was inevitable: being both different, the Other is always going to be either an enemy or a friend as the Other is different than the subject itself (Schmitt 2007: 26.). In the case of the AKP, the overwhelming recognition and support, given by the Turkish people, enabled it to rise above its “corporeity”, supersede the Other to be “for itself”, and eventually, gain the monopoly over Turkey’s governance (Hegel 1967: 429–431). Hence, it is not surprising that following another win in the elections in 2011, the AKP’s efforts become even more prominent as it began to replace officials in crucial points of the governance with pro-AKP elements.
7.1. First stage: Creating new subjectivity for Turkey in the international system

On the external front, Turkey began to create a new subjectivity to support its objective goals. Indicatively, the creation of subjectivity and then, its identification with the object is an important prerequisite for freedom. When it comes to the subjectivity itself, it is produced through the sublation and negation of the consciousness with the Other and it constitutes the identity of the object in relation to and with the other consciousness (Hegel 1967: 431). This leitmotif is also visible in the process of national branding and the creation of competitive identity in the contemporary international system. As Browning and Oliveira (2017: 481–501) indicate, the states create new subjectivities to attain recognition from other countries and as a tool of state-cohesion, ontological security, and (self-) esteem in an unfolding anarchical state of affairs. This seems to be the case for the post-2008 Turkey’s interest-based approach to its foreign affairs, described by Tank Oğuzlu (2011) as “Turkey-centrism.” Contrary to Kemalist dependency on the West, the AKP started to push for a different narrative questioning “the idea that Turkey is a mere tool for the materialization of Western security interests in other locations” (Oğuzlu 2011: 981). Pushed by desire and the internal legitimacy and having transcended its ontological and material insecurities (see Onis 2006), Erdoğan confronted the Western imaginary of Turkey as a vessel and a bridge for Western interest and instead, strived for relations with the Europe/West on a more equal footing (Oğuzlu and Ozpek 2008: 991–995).

The AKP's newfound subjectivity was created through sublation and manipulation of the other's consciousness (the West/Europe) for its transcendence. An excellent example of such an endeavour is the re-emergence of the “Turkish model” during the occurrence of the Arab Spring. Since its appearance in 1991, this model represented the sublation of Western elements (such as economic liberalization, constitutionalism, and membership in European institutions) into a contemporary Islamic setting, supported by claims of Ottoman heritage (Kalin 2011: 18–21). The aspect of manipulation was located in the conundrum: on the one hand, Turkey’s attractiveness stems from its membership and “reflection” in the Western sphere; on the other hand, it has a Sunni leader, different from the other Western players in the region, that considers Islamist states and parties as “reactionary” powers. So, the AKP sought to utilize the existing pluralism to portray itself as an ally to nations and communities with different identities and policies, a dichotomy that was doomed from the start (Fairhead 2017: 39–54).

Surprisingly, the AKP’s model found initially a lot of success and enjoyed the support of Western institutions and local entities, even though AKP’s cautious rhetoric about the model itself (see Shlykov 2018). The reformers in Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia, often cited Turkey and the AKP as models (Kenyon 2012). Moderate pro-Islamic political movements across the region started using Erdoğan’s party “justice and development” in the name of their parties: for example, Justice and Development Parties sprang up in Libya and Tunisia. At the same time, the West started using Turkey
as an example: in 2011, US President Barack Obama stated that a secular democratic Turkey could pose a model of development for other Muslim countries in the region (Corriere della Sera 2010). As such, the AKP began to pursue a transformative foreign policy in its region that similarly to the EU targeted to contribute to regional integration and interdependence (Ülgen 2011: 27).

The West/Europe played a crucial role in Turkey's newfound subjectivity. Apart from the foreshown legitimacy, the changing dynamics of the international system contributed to Turkey's proactive foreign policy. In the post-9/11era, the Western liberal order experienced a series of events that challenged its pre-existing monopoly of the 1990s, hence unravelling that in lieu of Francis Fukuyama's statement, liberalism was not the end of history (Rockmore 2006: 281–298). For example, during the second term, the AKP saw the retreat of the US from its region and a global economic crisis that almost put an end to the European project. These crises not only challenged the Western identity and knowledge of itself but also resulted in the re-emergence of negating and sublating view of the Other (represented by the Middle East). The latter began to be manipulated by populist and authoritarian leaders to denote the benefits of Western values and offer a temporary perception of cohesion (e.g., narratives of clash civilization) (see Ryan 2019). It also contributed significantly to AKP's increased efforts to ascend Turkey to the Western sphere by creating a partially Western identity; a "modus operandi" similar to Kemal's praxes in the first years of the formation of Kemalism.

As such, the AKP applied to join the EU, on the one hand, and invested in the strategic relationship with the United States and NATO, on the other hand. However, the failure of its Westernization, the internal repressive reforms, the further Islamization of politics, and the lack of recognition as an equal and ally by the West/Europe (e.g., the 2007 end of the accession negotiations with the European Union) initiated a period of political de-liberalization in Turkey (Kramer 2006: 24).

8. Second stage: Reaction and death struggle

The end of the dialectic's first stage found the AKP seeking to transcend its objectivity through the formulation of new subjectivity (Turkish model) relying on the sublation and manipulation of elements of the Other. This subjectivity was supported by the Turkish population, the West/Europe, and other regional states, thus providing the AKP with the legitimacy to revise the pre-existing Kemalist elements, seek a more active foreign policy, and impose its subjectivity domestically. However, as foreshadowed in the previous

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3 Inspired by the work of Oleksandra Seliverstova (2015) and her concept of Imaginary West, the paper refers to West as the imaginary construction of the West within the discourse of the populist based on geographic, cultural, and socio-political distinctions (e.g., the division Islam-Christianity, South-North, developing and developed countries).
chapter, the AKP soon confronted serious obstacles to its ambitious agenda, which can be better understood by Hegel’s master-slave dialectic.

In the second stage, Hegel argues that although achieving a degree of freedom, the consciousness needs to be recognized by another ego, another human self in which it confronts itself (Hegel 1967: 428). Pushed by desire, the subject is forced out of itself into the world and the confrontation with the other consciousness. For the philosopher, this confrontation occurs in the natural state, whereby human beings motivated merely by survival, compete for food, shelter, and resource. Notably, Hegel’s metaphor of the natural state coincides with the notion of anarchy used in the field of International Relations to describe the lack of any supreme authority or coercive power to enforce the law or order of international politics (Milner 1991: 67–69). For Hegel, the state of nature is synonymous with confrontation as when there is no law, there is war (MackKay and Levin 2018: 80–85). This is also the case for the two consciousness in the dialectic, which are positioned in the natural states are pushed towards a fight of recognition [and universalism] (...) [and] a life and death struggle (Hegel 1967: 433). In this death struggle, each consciousness locates its limits through the extortion of itself to a maximum effort.

8.1. Second stage: The progressive diminishment of the opposition

Following the initial upsurge of the Arab Spring, the reformist movements in Libya, Syria, and Yemen quickly worsened, new major powers like Russia and China got involved in the conflict, and the West/Europe proved highly inefficient in pre-empting the violence among domestic actors, often supported by rival Arab regimes. Despite the initial popularity of Turkey’s “Turkish Model”, the country was soon marginalized from the shaping of region balances and policies by the great powers. This shift could be understood from the prism of Hegel’s concepts of Permanence (Selbständigkeit) and Impermanence (Unelbständigkeit): the former refers to a lasting, always existing, ceaseless, and without stopping, recognition; the latter means a temporary or not lasting recognition. For the philosopher, freedom is possible only through permanent recognition. Hence, the initial success of AKP’s foreign policy and Turkish model can be interpreted as a temporal recognition.

For AKP, the lack of permanent recognition as an equal by the West/Europe and other major powers resulted in the emergence of pre-existing postcolonial anxieties and structural insecurities. To avert these insecurities, Turkey became embroiled in regional conflicts (e.g., Syria or the participation in NATO’s failed operation in Libya in 2011), thus disputing its pre-existing non-confrontational subjectivity. This shift resulted in the cease of recognition of Turkey as a regional model and the dramatic transformation in Turkish foreign policy as “zero neighbours without problems” (Zalewski 2013). For example, the relations with the Nouri al-Maliki government in Iraq entered an impasse and the
newfound Egyptian government did not continue the positive relations with Turkey as its predecessor (Kirişci 2013).

The West/Europe also began to dismiss Turkey’s insecurities of the state and focused instead on promoting its interests in the region (Insight Turkey 2013). For example, despite the Turkish view of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) as terrorists, the US collaborated with them to tackle the Islamic State (Sloat 2019). While the EU pursued interest-based relations with Turkey, its discourse indicated that it did not consider it equal: it either undermined the possibility of accession talks or continued the criticism of AKP’s anti-democratic policies in Turkey (Ibid.). Even following the collaboration with Western counterparts regarding NATO’s operation in Libya, which brought AKP into a confrontation with the other Arab States, Turkey remained another “ordinary object” for the West/Europe (Leitch 2018: 554).

At the same time, the economic impact and political consequences of the Arab Spring resulted in internal turmoil. A turning point was the 2013 Gezi Protests, initially sparked by the urban development plan for Istanbul’s Taksim Gezi Park (Altunışık 2013: 7–8; DW 2018). The brutal police repression used against the anti-government protests in Istanbul and across Turkey combined with Erdoğan’s denigrating discourse toward the protestors validated the pre-existing fears of growing Erdoğanism following the 2011 election (Ozen 2015). The events of the Gezi Park were met with criticism by not only Western states but also regional Muslim leaders that were previously citing Turkey as a model for becoming (Zihinoğlu 2019). However, these protests were just one of the many indications regarding the growing internal Erdoğanism.

Following the 2013 events, the AKP began to use increasingly populist discourse and “us-vs-them” narratives to ostracize the remaining opposition and portray them as the enemy to the public. Considering the lack of direct danger to the nation’s sovereignty, the AKP had to use polarizing discourse to both politicize the confrontation and justify the extraordinary measures (Williams 2003: 515–520). Within the context of the Hegelian dialectic, this increasing authoritarianism can be interpreted either as AKP’s efforts to gain an absolute monopoly over the political power or the “last stand” of representatives of the pre-existing consciousness represented by Kemalism and other internal forces of opposition. Yet, as Mustafa Akyol (2016) stresses, the old establishment was already dealt with on the bureaucratic level by 2013, hence foreshadowing the result of this death struggle.

Having partially dealt with Kemalism, Erdoğan targeted other potential threats like the Hizmet movement led by Fethullah Gülen by adopting policies directly challenging their authority (e.g., shutting down prep schools run by the movement or the raid against newspaper and TV stations with close ties to Gülen). Despite Gülen’s attempts to undermine the AKP (see the massive scandal connecting the government with the illicit trade of Iranian gold), the 2014 election win and the 2016 coup d’état provided enough momentum and ploy to prosecute the Gülenists. The latter also signalized the
establishment of the monopoly of Turkey within the national context and the rise of Erdoğanism, as the coup became a pretext for the removal of anyone who criticized the leading party (Yilmaz and Bashirov 2018: 1818).

8.2. Second stage: The foundations for the master-slave dialectic with the West/Europe

An entirely different pattern is present in the case of the AKP’s inter-subjective confrontation with the West/Europe. The rupture became already visible within the context of the 2013 Gezi protests, when opposing its so far defensive and usually apologetic stance, the AKP leaders started questioning whether the West/Europe had the moral standing to criticize Turkey. In his speeches, Erdoğan constantly referred to similar protests in Germany and France, while presenting Turkey as much freer than almost all of the EU member countries (Çapan and Zarakol 2019: 274–275). Notably, as Çapan and Zarakol (2019: 275) note, the AKP began imitating Kemalist scripts about internal and external threats while in parallel continuing to compare to Europe for validation.

The AKP also started to increasingly attribute its internal and external problems to the influence and actions of external players. Although this pattern began, it became increasingly frequent following the rise of Erdoğanism and the internal undermining of democratic laws. For instance, the CIA and other European countries, notably Germany, Norway, and the Netherlands were accused in the following years of supporting the Gülenists’ efforts to infiltrate the Turkish state (Karlıdağ 2016). Still, this discourse should be interpreted as an epiphenomenon of a growing asymmetry between the AKP’s Turkey and the West/Europe, which became apparent during the events following the Arab Spring. While AKP targeted constantly the West/Europe, it continued to consider Europe as the only proper yardstick by which to measure progress and the US as a crucial player in regional affairs (Çapan and Zarakol 2019: 26). It might have enjoyed elementary recognition (e.g., the EU-Turkey statement adopted in 2015), but there was a fundamental imbalance implying that they are not the same. In Hegelian terms, this disruption signalizes the establishment of a metaphorical master-slave bond between the two entities and consciousnesses. As the paper shows, the combination of this asymmetry with Turkey’s internal populism facilitated the emergence of AKP’s faulty postcoloniality and the identity of New Turkey.

9. Master and Slave: Turkish postcolonial colonialism

In the master-slave bondage, the two consciousness are entangled in a one-sided relationship: while the master has transcended immediacy and attained a degree of freedom, the slave has chosen out of fear to subordinate to attain elementary recognition (Hegel 1967: 433). The master simultaneously requires the slaves as a total negation
would mean the failure of achievement of self-consciousness. In parallel, for Hegel, the subordination and fear of the slave are crucial for the development of the slave as the realization of his/her position brings him/her closer to freedom.

That was indeed the case for AKP’s postcolonial subjectivity, which began to take shape in 2014. Specifically, after the failure of the Turkish model and the inter-subjective collision with the West/Europe, the newly elected government of Erdoğan realized the need for the creation of a new subjectivity divergent from the previous one (Aslan 2013: 28). The negation of Western and liberal elements from the party’s ideology and governance created an ideological vacuum that came to be filled with postcolonial notions and an alleged post-colonial free consciousness, the notion of the so-called New Turkey (Çapan and Zarakol 2019: 275–280). Since 2014, postcolonial research centres, such as SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research), began to spur in Turkey promoting the newfound subjectivity, one that symbolized the creation of a new state, independent and critical of Western notions and institutions (Çapan and Zarakol 198).

The notion of New Turkey also led to further elaboration and debates on the place of Turkey in the international system. Nebi Mis and Ali Aslan (2014: 26) called for a post-Kemalist, post-Western, and post-Westphalian Turkey that seeks to transform the global politics, while Murat Yesiltas (2014: 43) targeted the pre-existing Turkish reproduction and dependency on Western thinking and norms. This new movement in Turkish thought called for a distinct break with the problematic Kemalism (which became associated with colonialism) and the disruption of the problematic Westphalian and Western foundations. Indicatively, to justify the latter, scholars like Tuncay Kardas presented the case of the Arab Spring as the attempt of the Middle Eastern states to break off from the Western-imposed sovereignty, and the Islamic State as a challenge to the primary institutions founding the modern politics (Yesiltas and Kardas 2015: 78).

Not surprisingly, the two themes, namely the association of new Turkey with new subjectivity and the criticism of Eurocentrism, became also apparent in the speeches of the AKP official after 2014. In their article, Çapan and Zarakol show that Davutoğlu has repeatedly for years targeted the Eurocentrism driving the international institutions like the United Nations and promoted the need for the recaption of the unifying spirit of Anatolia (Davutoğlu 2013; Davutoğlu 2016). Erdoğan simultaneously challenged the status of borders and postcolonial imaginary that was created following the First World War and instead, argued for an Ottoman and Muslim solution to Western colonialism (Erdoğan 2014; Daily Sabah 2016). This discourse constituted a great divergence from the a priori narratives supporting the Turkish model as it sought to highlight and exploit the diametrically asymmetrical nature of Turkey’s relationship with the Western institutions and the overall inequality guiding the international order.

Indeed, Hegel considers it quintessential for the slave to realize his problematic obedience to the master’s single, contingent will rather than to an orthodox truly, universal, rational will (Hegel 1967: 433). To escape this unfair bondage and the master’s
monopoly, the slave needs to work (Arbeit) and use its own creativity and products. The AKP’s revisionist policies and newfound subjectivity (the exploitation of the migration agreement with the EU or collaboration with China and Russia) can be thus perceived as the slave’s labour (Arbeit) to transform the world in accordance with her/his disposition. Yet, Hegel argues that labour is not enough to attain freedom. Instead, a slave rises to genuine self-consciousness through the process of culture-formation of being-in-itself, also called participative culture production (Bildung) (Hegel 1974: 384). Specifically, this notion refers to a kind of formative experience that results in the transformation of unformed, “natural” individuals (or people) into subjects who both aspire to be free and who possess the subjective capacities needed to realize their freedom” (Neuhouser 2000: 149).

As Andreja Novakovic (2017: 91) argues, participative culture production is crucial for the transcendence of slaves as it helps a consciousness position itself from the Otherness and be reflective enough to create a new subjectivity. In line with Schmitt’s Hegelianism, this process allows the slave to induce an enemy/foe distinction that will help him/her to progress and obtain control over his/her subjectivity. For Schmitt, enemies and conflict are essential to the nature of the world and meaning in life (Schmitt 2007: 26–28). As such, the post-2014 AKP’s ideological shift should be interpreted as an effort to utilize its servant status, contest the Western/European masterhood, and eventually, differentiate itself from not only other European/Western and regional states but also the pro-liberal and Western-orient Turkey of the previous years.

While AKP’s modus operandi might initially look like a noble act, this is not the case at all. As Çapan and Zarakol show (2017: 202–205), the party utilized Turkey’s postcoloniality, servant status, and religious and historical heritage to serve the growing internal Erdoğanism. By portraying Turkey in ontological danger and the West/Europe as the external enemy, the AKP sought to achieve internal homogenization and adopt even more authoritarian and ambitious policies. However, as the paper argues, the AKP has not used its new ‘Bildung’ or the enemy/foe distinction to rise above selfish individuality and transcend the master-slave dialectic; instead, it wants to mimic the master and use it to justify its own egotism (Hegel 1967: 435).

## 10. Postcolonialism colonialism: what Hegel could not predict

Having developed a self-determinant and reflective image of itself and realizing its agency through labour, the slave manages to overcome the limits set by his/her status and ascends to ideality; at the same time, the master transcends its immediacy and dependency and finally acquires his/her recognition. For Hegel, this praxis would be the ordinary resolution of the dialectic and the beginning of the creation of universality (Allgemeinheit) but influenced by the values of the Enlightenment, the philosopher could not foresee the distortion of his dialectic, the slave’s manipulation of his/her servitude
against the master. Although Hegel highlights the slave mimicism of the master, as a result of the labour, he does not offer any explanation of the evolution of this disruption in his dialectical system.

The AKP’s “postcolonial colonialism” is an excellent manifestation of such a phenomenon. Instead of seeking to create a postcolonial free self-consciousness, the AKP used the newfound “Bildung” to employ postcolonial arguments and justify the colonial and authoritarian abuses of Erdoğan. For instance, Erdoğan has not been hesitant to employ such narratives to shield his government from the European critique regarding his treatment of the Kurdish population and the drop of the Turkish lira (France 24 2019; DW 2020). However, what is more, they were employed to create a worldview where Kemalism and the West/Europe hinder Turkey from achieving totality, thus constituting a threat to Turkish sovereignty, public, and national interests. This inability fuels the impossibility between the two sides and becomes the driving force of new faulty postcolonial subjectivity in the international system (Laclau and Mouffe 1985: 29).

This new subjectivity also became the justification for the AKP to pursue greater involvement in Libya, Libya, Syria, and West Africa, and challenge directly the interest of the West/Europe (e.g., the amplification of provocation in the Eastern Mediterranean) (Al Jazeera 2020). To comprehend Turkey’s behaviour, the paper turns to Franz Fanon’s work. In lieu of Hegel’s focus on the role of work,” Fanon’s slave abandons the object in the desire to be ‘like his master” in the postcolonial world, thus becoming the colonialist himself/herself (Fanon 2004: 46). This outcome is possible due to the unsuccessful dissolution of the master-slave dialectic and the creation of the master and the salve of what Hegel refers to as unhappy consciousness: a “dual consciousness of itself, as self-liberating, unchangeable, and self-identical, and as self-bewildering and self-perverting, and it is the awareness of this self-contradictory nature of itself” (Hegel 1997: 126).

10.1. Postcolonialism colonialism: Unhappy consciousness

Unhappy consciousness is a consciousness that experiences itself as divided within and against itself. Being aware of the duality of master and slave, it seeks to find a conception reconciling both. Putting it simply, this consciousness can be described as being two persons in one: it fluctuates between identifying with the slave or the other (master) and confronts a tension between infinite and finite aspects of itself (Burbridge 1978: 67–75). While Hegel used this notion to refer to Christianity, it can be applied to the case of post-2016 Turkey’s ideology and praxes.

AKP’s ”New Turkey” is a form of unhappy consciousness, as it is a subjectivity that wavers between identifying with the Ottoman Empire and the victim of the postcolonial international system led by the West/Europe. After 2016, Erdoğan has thus sought to politicize this unhappy consciousness to portray the West/Europe as both Turkey’s historical enemy and an obstacle to Turkey’s goal of becoming the Ottoman Empire’s heir.
This polarization creates an artificial state of emergency, where Turkey is under attack from the West/Europe (e.g., the 2016 coup d’état organized by Gülen with the support of Europe and the US). This state also produces a fertile ground for Erdoğan to use postcolonial narratives, adopt authoritarian policies, and justify growing Erdoğanism, as a way to protect Turkey from the colonial West/Europe. As Carl Schmitt points out, the existence of a common enemy helps the homogeneity and the unification of the state; in this case, it results in an increase in the popularity of AKP and further ostracization of internal pro-liberal, Western, and Kemalist elements (Schmitt 2007: 46–48).

Religion has also played a crucial role in the formation of this polarisation and the aggravation of ontological insecurities. For instance, following the 2015-2016 terrorist attacks in Europe, in a speech in the Turkish city of Sakarya, Erdoğan invoked the medieval religious wars between Christian Europe and the Islamic Middle East in the context of present-day escalating tensions between the European Union and Turkey (DW 2017). This statement shows not only AKP’s identification with the Ottoman Empire but also the induction of a clash of civilizations narrative that positions Europe as the opposition to Islam. The Islamic identity has played an even greater role within the domestic (e.g., more religious reforms) and international context, given that it had to fill the vacuum created by the dissolution of pre-existing liberalism Notably, as Hegel states, religion can explain, justify, and legitimate almost any state activity and it is a crucial mechanism of building state cohesion (Hegel 2018).

10.2. Postcolonialism colonialism: The role of the West in the development of Turkey’s postcolonial subjectivity

The paper has already established that the lack of recognition and Turkey’s marginalization contributed greatly to the emergence of postcolonial subjectivity. It also helped the revitalization of pre-existing ontological and temporal insecurities in the Turkish imaginary, which have been skilfully utilized by AKP to fuel internal populism. Nevertheless, another factor that facilitated the formation of AKP’s new postcolonial subjectivity and the politicization of the master-slave dialectic was the series of challenges that the West/Europe faced in the second half of the 2010s. For example, in 2016, the election of Donald Trump, an anti-liberal and deeply nativist at the wheel of the liberal order revealed the fragility of the existing liberal consciousness (Stokes 2018: 149). Furthermore, as Cas Mudde (2019) shows, the mainstreaming of anti-liberal and Trump’s success inspired similar far right and radical right populists in Europe, which had recently suffered from the migration and economic crises and a series of terrorist attacks after 2015. As such, Europe experienced a surge of radical ideas targeting Islam, challenging liberalism, and arguing for a more nativist and conservative-led future. This shift fuelled the enemy/foe worldview and postcolonial narratives used by global authoritarian populist regimes to highlight Western double standards and hypocrisy. In addition, they
reaffirmed the existing ontological insecurities, which have been skilfully employed by populists to promote further their agendas since.

Such phenomena undermined the West/Europe’s monopoly, egotism, and mastership, hence enabling other takes on universality to appear and creating an ideological vacuum that non-Western players would seek to fill with their initiatives. For Hegel, the master also needs recognition (from another self-consciousness, not mere consciousness), or in Hegel’s words, it is a “consciousness existing for itself which is mediated with itself through another consciousness” (Hegel 1988: 115). As a slave is the master’s necessary correlate, this means that: the master is master only because he/she recognized by the slave, otherwise his/her existence is empty without this opposing consciousness endowing it with meaning. In other words, by being challenged and not recognized by the Other, the master loses his identity as the master and is tasked with founding a new subjectivity.

The slave’s unhappy consciousness and the master’s insecurity eventually bring the two sides to what Alexander Kojève regards as the second great struggle to the death between the devastated figures of master and slave, which is nothing than the repetition of the first struggle by inversion for “pure prestige” (Kojève 1980: 69). However, contrary to the first struggle, this time the slave is a synthesis of the “servile element of work” and the “element of the Struggle over life and death.” This is also the case for the AKP and the West/Europe that seem to be also stuck in a second death struggle: the former employs “postcolonial colonialism” to sustain the domestic Erdoğanism and the foreign neo-Ottoman policies, on the one hand; the latter is stuck in an egotistic view of universalism and faced with internal disruptions, on the other hand.

Being for pure prestige, the second death struggle will not dissolve as it would coincide with AKP’s acceptance of its manipulation of the existing parasitic relation and thus, its removal from power. Therefore, the paper concludes that due to this state of affairs, Turkey will not attain a post-colonial free self-consciousness; instead, the AKP will continue or intensify the use of postcolonial arguments to maintain the existing polarization and image of the West as the one liable for Turkey’s external and internal problems.

11. Conclusion

The paper seeks to explain the roots and driving forces behind the recent use of postcolonial arguments by populist authoritarian governments targeting the West/Europe. To do so, it argues for the induction of an already existing tool in its analysis, the Hegel’s master and slave dialectic. The growing popularity and similarities among the postcolonial abuses indicate that they are contextual epiphenomena of a globalized issue, thus formulating the need for epistemological innovation and broader frameworks. Although having a vexed relationship with contemporary postcolonial
academia, the master-slave dialectic could offer a normative and empirical reading of this newly emerged phenomenon. Given the duality guiding these postcolonial abuses (us-vs-them), the Hegelian dialectic provides a truly postcolonial reading of the roots of this practice, which takes into consideration the role of the systemic insecurities and the West/Europe in its emergence.

At the same time, as a dynamic and self-reflective tool, it can delineate the impact of temporal insecurities and domestic forces on the subjectivity and behaviour of the metaphorical slave and the problems associated with its employment by populist leaders. Yet, it is important to highlight that the research does not argue for the introduction of a totalizing theory; instead, it recommends a framework for potential future analysis, which has been largely neglected by the contemporary academic literature. To display the applicability and explanatory potential of the master-slave dialectic, the paper uses a case study of the Justice and Development’s (AKP) “postcolonialism colonialism” in Turkey, a term borrowed from the work of Turkish scholars Zeynep Gülşah Çapan and Ayşe Zarakol. The research also adopts a dialogical approach to the theory itself; it juxtaposes the case study with the findings contrapuntally, thus offering a contextually sensitive and theoretically astute framework.

Through in-depth analyses of the two stages of the dialectic, the paper concludes that the postcoloniality is a result of the asymmetrical relationship in which Turkey is entangled with the West/Europe. This bondage become apparent in the aftermath of the events of the Arab Spring when the AKP was marginalized by the West/Europe and the regional states even though it had made efforts to appeal to both with its newfound subjectivity, the Turkish model. As such, following the win in the 2013 elections, the AKP began to construct a new postcolonial identity, or the New Turkey, which aimed to free Turkey from the Western dependency and problematic Kemalism. Specifically, the party began to challenge the Western norms and re-induce the Ottoman and Islamic elements in their subjectivity and identity. Both practices match the Hegelian slave’s praxes, who following the realization of his/her status, seek to attain self-consciousness through participative cultural production and labour.

However, as the paper shows, the AKP is different from Hegel’s slave. Due to the populist authoritarian characters of the government, especially after the 2016 coup d’état, the postcolonial arguments have been distorted to serve the authoritarian goals of the party and justify colonial endeavours in the region. The disruption between subjectivity and objectivity indicates that the party operates based on an unhappy consciousness, which is employed to gather internal legitimacy and continue the reign of Erdoğan and his officials. This process was further facilitated by internal problems in the West that revealed the shaky foundations of the Western liberal order. Events like the election of Donald Trump caused the further fragmentation of the international order and the creation of an ideological vacuum that non-Western actors sought to fill and exploit.
The slave’s unhappy consciousness and the master’s insecurity bring the two sides to what Alexander Kojève regards as the second great struggle to the death between the devastated figures of master and slave. In another world, while the AKP employs postcolonial colonialism to sustain the domestic Erdoğanism and the foreign neo-Ottoman policies, the latter is stuck in an egotistic view of universalism and faced with internal disruptions. In Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, the dissolution of dialectic and the beginning of universalism start from the transcendence of materiality and egotism, and “the affirmative awareness of self in another self” (Hegel 1967: 436).

Although the reciprocal dimension of Hegelian universalism holds for the dissolution of postcolonial abuses, this process is obstructed by the authoritarian populist nature of the governments. Nonetheless, to paraphrase Hegel’s quote: the owl of [freedom] spreads its wings only with the coming of the dusk” (Hegel 1952: 13). Despite the current AKP’s monopoly of power, the rising recognition of the situation in Turkey signalizes that this dominance will not last long. At the same time, the West/Europe needs to understand that true universalism comes reciprocally and not in negating manner.

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